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1. Introduction  
One of the purposes of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) is supervising and regulating 
the US banks and other important financial institutions to achieve a safe and sound banking and 
financial system. If the Fed is successful in its regulatory actions, this may help the banks to operate 
in a more stable and less problematic environment, which in turn enables the banks to use their 
inputs more effectively when producing the financial products. Not using the right level and mix 
of inputs or not producing the right output mix would lead to suboptimal cost levels. This affects 
the bank’s profitability negatively and may increase the insolvency risk. Hence, the bank managers 
and policymakers should be concerned with the cost efficiency levels of banks.  
The Fed plays a vital role in handling liquidity shortages of financial institutions. For 
example, Cecchetti and Disyatat (2010) have found that, in the inquietude of 2008 financial crisis, 
as a lender of last resort, the Fed has improved the banks’ liquidity operations through intense 
interest implication. A healthy management of liquidity operations may help the banks to reduce 
their costs. Moreover, by resorting interest rate strategies, the Fed can eliminate the conflict 
between monetary policymakers and banks. This would help to assure that there are adequate 
financial activities and the banks reduce the amount of suboptimal risk taking actions. Some 
important duties of the Board of Governors are authorizing monetary and financial policy and 
approving regulations and policies. These actions may help the banks to operate in a more stable 
environment and also lift up or ease some of the operating difficulties of banks, which in turn can 
result in cost reductions. If these regulatory actions have effects that increase the competitiveness 
of the banking sector, then quiet life hypothesis of Hicks (1935) suggests that the efficiency of the 
banks are likely to increase. One of the roles of the Fed’s delegated authority is making decisions 
on ownership structures such as considering the grant of merging and acquiring other companies, 
approving to purchase assets or shares, permitting or denying changing or extending the period for 
a change in bank control, etc. The ownership structure plays a serious role in shaping how a bank 
is managed and thus how effective the management is in achieving the desired optimal outcomes 
such as minimizing the costs. Hence, “right decisions” by the Fed’s delegated authority may help 
the banking sector to reach outcomes that are more desirable. On the other hand, if the Fed is not 
successful in the actions mentioned, this may result in suboptimal outcomes for the banks.  
In this study, we want to understand the effect of the Fed’s involvement in the banking 
system on the cost efficiency of the US banks. For this purpose, we use the number of actions by 
the Fed as a proxy to measure the extent of the Fed’s activity. A large number of actions taken by 
the Fed may lead to less cost efficiency if this increased work burden clouds the Fed’s ability to 
make right decisions. On the other hand, a high involvement (i.e., larger number of actions) may 
improve the cost efficiency for the banking system if these actions help the banks to overcome the 
obstacles that are cost increasing. Hence, it is our interest to understand whether higher 
involvement of the Fed actually leads to higher cost efficiency levels for the US banking system. 
For this purpose, we examine the individual commercial US bank data that covers the years 
between 1997 and 2007. This is a period when the Fed decreased the amount of its actions over 
time. For example, in 1997 the total number of the Fed actions were 3462 whereas in 2007 it was 
only 1741. Therefore, over the years the Fed started to decrease its level of intervention, measured 
by the number of actions, to the banking sector. It turns out that the total number of actions by the 
Fed have a positive effect on cost efficiency. Hence, the Fed’s efforts pay off and overall they 
improve the bank efficiency. This illustrates that besides its other objectives the Fed is also 
effective for achieving better cost efficiency in the banking sector. 
In the next section, we provide the details of our dataset, empirical model, and estimation 
results. Then, we finalize our paper with concluding remarks. 
 
2. Empirical Model and Estimation Results 
2.1. Data 
Our main dataset for the individual commercial bank data is constructed from the Reports 
of Condition and Income (or Call Reports) of the Federal Reserve System. Our data set for the cost 
function variables are obtained from the data set collected by Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012) 
(KKS). Our annual year-end dataset covers the years between 1997 and 2007.1 Our data set 
considers the period before 2008 crisis as post-crisis policies of the Fed is somewhat 
unconventional and aggressive, e.g., the zero interest policy of the Fed. We follow the 
intermediation approach when specifying inputs and outputs. The bank uses labor and capital to 
attract deposits, which are used to fund loans and other earning assets. Missing observations and 
observations with incorrect signs are dropped. All the monetary units are deflated to 2005 prices 
using the consumer price index obtained by Bureau of Economic Analysis. Among others, 
Almanidis, Karakaplan, and Kutlu (2016), Tsionas (2002), and Almanidis (2013) argue that the 
banking industry is characterized by heterogeneous technologies. A common frontier assumption 
for all banks may potentially lead to inconsistent parameter and distorted efficiency estimates. 
Hence, in order avoid this problem, in our benchmark scenario we only consider the banks with 
average asset size of more than $1 billion. In the final sample, we have 657 banks for the 
benchmark scenario.2  
Our main variable of interest for examining efficiency is the number of actions by the Fed, 
we hand-collected this variable by counting the weekly actions of the Board of Governors, its staff, 
and the Federal Reserve Banks.3 The actions that were taken by the Fed are either by the Board of 
Governors or by the Fed’s delegated authority. The actions taken by the Board of Governors 
include deciding discount rates, publishing testimony and statements, authorizing monetary and 
financial policy, approving regulations and policies, approving applications of bank holding 
companies, etc. On the other hand, the delegated authority deals with the approval of establishing 
new branches, considering the grant of merging and acquiring other companies, approving to 
purchase assets or shares, permitting or denying changing or extending the period for a change in 
bank control etc. The delegated authority also oversees the approval of any new member of the 
Fed. The number of actions by the Fed include all of the aforementioned actions. 
In Table 1, we provide the summary statistics and descriptions of the variables that we use 
in this study. The outputs are denoted by Y and the input prices are denoted by W. Gross total 
equity variable, E, is included in the cost frontier to reflect different risk attitudes of banks. The 
effect of size on bank efficiency is captured by the total assets, TA, variable. Since the number of 
banks may affect the number of actions by the Fed, we include the market and time specific number 
of banks as an additional explanatory variable for the inefficiency. This variable also serves as a 
proxy for competition in a market. Following Akins, Li, and Rusticus (2016), Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), and Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2016), we assume that states are the 
markets. Hence, the number of banks are year-state specific.  
 
                                                 
1 Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012) use a dataset that covers years between 1976 and 2007. However, the additional 
variables that we use in our study only cover the years starting from 1997. 
2 At some time periods, a bank in our final data set may still have asset size smaller than $1 billion.  
3 The reports are announced in https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h2/. This variable is not included in the dataset 
of Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012). 




5th Percentile 95th Percentile 
TC Total costs $ 0.674 B $ 2.844 B $ 0.039 B $ 2.472 B 
Y1 Total securities $ 2.100 B $ 8.914 B $ 0.075 B $ 7.148 B 
Y2 Total loans $ 7.503 B $ 30.750 B $ 0.392 B $ 28.146 B 
W1 Cost of fixed assets 35.853 24.883 14.132 81.959 
W2 Cost of labor 48.976 12.162 31.759 71.672 
W3 Cost of borrowed funds 2.922 1.045 1.184 4.466 
TA Total assets $ 11.913 B $ 52.676 B $ 0.715 B $ 42.100 B 
E Gross total equity $ 1.092 B $ 4.570 B $ 0.057 B $ 3.825 B 
N Number of banks 233.284 197.228 23 736 
ACT Number of Fed actions 2650.207 578.342 1741 3488 
Number of observations = 4332 
Note: B stands for billions. 
 
2.2. Empirical Model and Stochastic Frontier Models 
In order to estimate the bank efficiency, we utilize stochastic frontier analysis. This 
approach assumes that the error term is composed of two components. One component is the usual 
two-sided error term and the other component is a non-negative error term that captures 
inefficiency. The panel stochastic frontier model that we estimate is given as follows:4 ln (�� ) = + ∑ �= + ∑ � (�� )= + ∑ �=+ ∑ � (�� )= + �� � + �� (�� ) � (�� )+ ∑ ∑ ϖ � � (�� )== + � + � + ∑ �=+ ∑ � (�� )= + ��+ � , � � , � � , ln � , + , 
 
 
where  is the time trend, ≥  is the one-sided term that captures cost inefficiency, and  is the 
usual two-sided error term. Since the cost function must be homogenous of degree one in input 
prices, we normalize the total cost and other input prices by � . This ensures that the homogeneity 
                                                 
4 We drop time and individual-specific indices, i.e., � and , for the sake of notational simplicity. 
assumption is satisfied. We assume that: = √ ′ � ∗, 
where   ∗~ �+ , �  and ′  are variables that explain inefficiency. Here, ∗ gives an individual 
specific dependence to the efficiency component, . The efficiency is predicted by: = − ̂  , 
where ̂  is the prediction of . Hence, when = , the bank is fully efficient; and as  
increases, the efficiency of the bank decreases. A positive coefficient for a variable in ′  indicates 
that this variable is positively related with inefficiency.  
The standard stochastic frontier models do not allow endogeneity, which maybe a problem 
in our case because there can be a feedback effect between the Fed’s actions and cost inefficiency 
of the banks. Similarly, a feedback effect maybe present between the extent of competition and 
inefficiency. Therefore, the standard stochastic frontier models may not be suitable for our model. 
When there are endogenous variables, our model can be estimated by using the limited information 
maximum likelihood method such as Kutlu (2010) and Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017a, 2017b). In 
particular, when any one of the regressors or  is correlated with the two-sided error term, , the 
parameter and efficiency estimates would be inconsistent. They overcome this difficulty by 
allowing the variables in the frontier or/and ′  to be correlated with . One advantage of their 
method is that the estimations are done in a single stage. The case with exogenous variables is a 
special case of this model. Kutlu and Karakaplan (2017b) and Amsler, Prokhorov, and Schmidt 
(2016) recommend testing the endogeneity by testing the significance of a bias correction term 
included in the model.5  
Guan et al. (2009) propose a two-stage the generalized method of moments (GMM) method 
that solves the endogeneity problem for stochastic frontier models when the endogenous variables 
are in the frontier.6 However, if there are endogenous variables in the distribution of  term, their 
method gives inconsistent efficiency estimates. Tran and Tsionas (2013) propose a GMM based 
solution by utilizing moment conditions derived from the log-likelihood function of Kutlu (2010). 
Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017b) propose a cross-sectional counterpart of Karakaplan and Kutlu 
(2017a). Kutlu and Karakaplan (2017a, 2017b) assume that ∗ term is independent of . Amsler, 
Prokhorov, and Schmidt (2016, 2017) relax this assumption utilizing a copula approach, which 
requires specifying a copula such as Gausian copula. This copula is convenient but it imposes some 
restrictions in the correlation structure. Also, the application of copula may be computationally 
demanding depending on the application. Hence, since it is a convenient and effective way to 
handle endogeneity in the stochastic frontier setting, we use the panel data stochastic frontier 
model of Kutlu (2010) and Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017a) in order to get the estimates that allow 
endogeneity. Therefore, we assume that the prediction equations for the endogenous variables are 
given by: = +  [ ̃  ] ≡ [ Ω− /  ]  ~ � ([  ] , [ � � �� �′ �  ]) 
where  is a vector of all endogenous variables (in our case = � � , ln ACT ′); = � ⊗Ω− / ′ where z is a vector of all exogenous variables;  are two-sided error terms; and ∗ is so 
                                                 
5 An earlier version of Kutlu and Karakaplan (2017b) is the first study proposing such a test.  
6 Guan et al. (2009) (GMM based) and Kutlu (2010) (MLE based) are the earliest papers that address the endogeneity 
problem in the SFA context.  
that it is independent from  and . Here, Ω is the variance-covariance matrix of , �  is the 
variance of , and � is the vector representing correlation between ̃ and . By a Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of ̃′, ′ is represented as follows: [ ̃  ] = [ �� �′ � √ − �′� ] [ ̃̃  ],  
where ̃ and ̃ ~ � ,  are independent. So, the frontier equation can be written as: = y′ + − Z ′ + e,  
where y = ln ���3 ; y′  is a vetor of regressors included in the frontier; = + , =� √ − �′� ̃ = � ̃ , and = � Ω− / � √ − �′�⁄ . Here, the term − Z ′  serves as a bias 
correction term. If this bias correction term is statistically significant, then we would concluded 
that there is endogeneity in the model.  
 
2.3. Estimation Results 
We consider two models. Model EN assumes that � �  and � �  are endogenous and 
the rest of the variables are exogenous. Model EX assumes that all variables are exogenous. In our 
benchmark model, we use the one year lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. 
The estimation results for our benchmark models are given in Table 2.7 In the prediction equations 
for endogenous variables, the t-values for the corresponding lagged instruments are large. In 
particular, for � �  and � �  the t-values are 452.8 and -17.4, respectively. This provides 
some evidence that the instruments are likely to be not weak. The endogeneity test rejects 
exogeneity at any conventional significance level. Hence, when interpreting the results, we use the 
Model EN. In any case, the coefficients for the variables that model inefficiency have the same 
sign for both models. Both models satisfy the regularity conditions (concavity and monotonicity) 
when the variables are evaluated at their medians. The median of ray scale economies for Model 
EX and Model EN are 1.47 and 1.43, respectively, which agrees with recent findings of Wheelock 
and Wilson (2012). 
The positive sign for the total assets variable indicates that as the total asset of a bank 
increases, the inefficiency would increase. This may be because of the increased complexity that 
larger banks face when they grow larger. The negative coefficient for the number of banks in a 
state variable indicates that as the competition increases the inefficiency decrease, which agrees 
with the quiet life hypothesis of Hicks (1935). According to this hypothesis, those firms with high 
market power enjoy their quiet life and act relaxed when optimizing their decisions, which in turn 
leads to more inefficiency. However, as the competition increases the banks would be compelled 
to perform more efficiently to overcome the negative effects of competitive pressure. Moreover, 
our main variable of interest, the total number of actions by the Fed, has a negative effect on 
inefficiency. Hence, the Fed’s effort pays off and improves the banking system in terms of cost 
efficiency. While efficiency improvement for banks is not the Fed’s only purpose, it is still 
important to understand whether the actions of the Fed lead to a better performing banking system 
in terms of cost management. Therefore, the Fed is a positive and relevant factor for achieving 
                                                 
7 Our estimation results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we include 2001 crisis dummy (equals one for 
2001 and zero otherwise) and post-crisis dummy (equals one for all years after 2001 and zero otherwise) along with 
time trend and its square. In particular, the mean efficiencies were 64.97 and 64.72 for Model EX and Model EN, 
respectively. Moreover, the signs of environmental variables (i.e., explanatory variables for cost efficiency) were the 
same as the benchmark scenario.  
better cost efficiency in the banking sector. Since the efficiency has a skewed distribution, the 
mean of this variable is not as informative as it would be for a variable with symmetric distribution. 
Hence, in Figure 1 we present the empirical distribution for our efficiency estimates. Even when  
 
Table 2. Cost Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results: Benchmark 
Dependent variable: ln(TC/W3)                 Model EX         Model EN 
Constant -1.3528***  (0.331) -2.1767***  (0.422) 
ln(W1/W3) -0.0260        (0.075) -0.2111**    (0.083) 
ln(W2/W3) 0.2640***  (0.100) 0.4464***  (0.106) 
ln(Y1) 0.1752***  (0.039) 0.1682***  (0.044) 
ln(Y2) 0.2850***  (0.054) 0.4359***  (0.066) 
ln(E) 0.2060***  (0.010) 0.1803***  (0.011) 
0.5 × ln(W1/W3)2 -0.0567***   0.014) -0.0666***  (0.016) 
ln(W1/W3) × ln(W2/W3) 0.0720***  (0.017) 0.0756 *** (0.018) 
0.5 × ln(W2/W3)2 0.1016***  (0.028) 0.1282***  (0.030) 
0.5 × ln(Y1)2 0.0427***  (0.002) 0.0558***  (0.003) 
ln(Y1) × ln(Y2) -0.0406***  (0.003) -0.0503***  (0.003) 
0.5 × ln(Y2)2 0.0582***  (0.005) 0.0572***  (0.006) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W1/W3) -0.0174***  (0.005) -0.0013        (0.006) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W2/W3) 0.0134*      (0.007) -0.0101        (0.008) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W1/W3) 0.0209***  (0.006) 0.0197***  (0.007) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W2/W3) -0.0272***  (0.009) -0.0234**    (0.010) 
t 0.0933***  (0.014) 0.0691***  (0.017) 
t2 -0.0020***  (0.001) 0.0015         (0.001) 
ln(W1/W3) × t -0.0070***  (0.002) -0.0059***  (0.002) 
ln(W2/W3) × t -0.0095***  (0.003) -0.0109***  (0.004) 
ln(Y1)  ×  t -0.0035***  (0.001) -0.0013        (0.001) 
ln(Y2)  ×  t -0.00238**  (0.001) -0.0041***  (0.001) 
Dependent variable: : ln �  
Constant -4.3128*** (0.024)    -4.4655*** (0.027) 
Dependent variable:  ln �  
Constant -2.3636**    (1.004)   1.3765         (1.685) 
ln(TA) 0.1835***  (0.032) 0.2560***  (0.036) 
t 0.0494***  (0.010) 0.0102         (0.012) 
ln(N) -0.0934***  (0.035) -0.0653*       (0.037) 
ln(ACT) -0.1697        (0.104) -0.7948***  (0.181) 
Average efficiency 65.04 64.71 
Median efficiency 64.79 64.31 
Log-likelihood 2043.73 9798.06 
Number of observations 4332 3570 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
  
the averages of efficiency estimates are close for different estimation methods; this does not 
necessarily imply that the estimates are similar. Indeed, for Model EX and Model EN efficiency 
estimates, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of the distributions at any 
conventional significance level (p-value = 0.0000). This is also verified by looking at the 
distributions. Hence, it is essential to handle endogeneity to be able to get proper estimates for 
efficiency. 
As a robustness check, we also estimated the same models for relatively smaller banks. 
This dataset includes banks with average asset sizes between $100 million and $1 billion. Again, 
both models satisfy the regularity conditions when the variables are evaluated at their medians. 
The qualitative results for efficiency variables are the same and presented in Table 3. The median 
of ray scale economies for Model EX and Model EN are 1.40 and 1.47, respectively.  
 
 
One may argue that the lagged Fed activity may be the relevant determinant of current cost 
efficiency. That is, the actions taken by the Fed current year may not show its effects on cost 
efficiency instantly. Hence, as a robustness check we use the one year lagged activity of the Fed 
as a determinant for efficiency, which we assume to be predetermined. Therefore, Model EN has 
only one endogenous variable, � � . Both Model EX and Model EN satisfy the regularity 
conditions when the variables are evaluated at their medians. The estimation results for this case 
is presented in Table 4. The exogeneity of � �  is rejected only at 10% significance level. 
Although the coefficient of � �  is not significant, it is negative, which is in line with our 
findings. The lagged Fed activity is significant and has a negative sign. This verifies our conclusion 
that the Fed activities have a positive effect on bank cost efficiency. The median of ray scale 
economies for Model EX and Model EN are 1.42 and 1.41, respectively. This is also in line with 
our other estimates. 
Finally, we examine whether different kinds of the Fed actions have different effects on 
cost efficiency. For this purpose, we use the number of actions that were taken by the Board of 
Governors (BGACT) and by the delegated authority (DAACT) separately. As mentioned earlier 
Board of Governors actions include deciding discount rates, publishing testimony and statements, 
authorizing monetary and financial policy, approving regulations and policies, approving 
application of bank holding companies, etc. Hence, broadly speaking, these are policy-oriented 
actions that are relatively more general. The delegated authority actions include the approval of 
establishing new branches, considering the grant of merging and acquiring other companies, 
approving to purchase assets or shares, permitting or denying changing or extending the period for 
a change in bank control etc. Hence, these are more related to the ownership structures of banks. 
We assume that � � , � � , and � �  are endogenous and we use their one year 
lagged values as instruments. The estimates are presented in Table 5. Both Model EX and Model 
EN satisfy the regularity conditions when the variables are evaluated at their medians. In both 
Model EX and Model EN, the coefficients of all these three variables are negative. Hence, both 
policy oriented and ownership structure related actions have led to improved cost efficiency for 
the banking sector in general. The median of ray scale economies for Model EX and Model EN 
are 1.46 and 1.41, respectively. These results are in line with what we found in our earlier 
estimates. The qualitative results for efficiency estimates are the same when we rather use the 
lagged values of � �  and � �  as predetermined explanatory variables for 
efficiency. Hence, we conclude that our result regarding the effect of Fed actions on cost efficiency 
are reasonably robust to a variety of different specifications. 
 
Table 3. Cost Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results: Total Asset Between 100M-1B 
Dependent variable: ln(TC/W3)                 Model EX         Model EN 
Constant 1.9477***  (0.180) -2.0925***  (0.249) 
ln(W1/W3) -0.0055        (0.024) -0.0612**    (0.027) 
ln(W2/W3) 0.3869***  (0.034) 0.4213***  (0.038) 
ln(Y1) 0.1364***  (0.015) 0.2251***  (0.018) 
ln(Y2) -0.2348***  (0.028) 0.4722***  (0.042) 
ln(E) 0.0951***  (0.003) 0.0735***  (0.004) 
0.5 × ln(W1/W3)2 -0.0505***  (0.003) -0.0453***  (0.003) 
ln(W1/W3) × ln(W2/W3) 0.0720***  (0.004) 0.0663***  (0.004) 
0.5 × ln(W2/W3)2 0.0849***  (0.007) 0.0814***  (0.007) 
0.5 × ln(Y1)2 0.0380***  (0.001) 0.0346***  (0.001) 
ln(Y1) × ln(Y2) -0.0323***  (0.001) -0.0379***  (0.002) 
0.5 × ln(Y2)2 0.1053***  (0.003) 0.0459***  (0.004) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W1/W3) 0.0114 *** (0.001) - 0.0094***  (0.001) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W2/W3) -0.0101***  (0.002) -0.0095***  (0.002) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W1/W3) -0.0112***  (0.002) -0.0039        (0.002) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W2/W3) -0.0114***  (0.003) -0.0142**    (0.003) 
t 0.1070***  (0.006) 0.0383***  (0.006) 
t2 -0.0009***  (0.000) 0.0016***  (0.000) 
ln(W1/W3) × t -0.0079***  (0.000) -0.0075***  (0.000) 
ln(W2/W3) × t -0.0044***  (0.001) -0.0012        (0.001) 
ln(Y1)  ×  t -0.0009***  (0.000) -0.0002        (0.000) 
ln(Y2)  ×  t -0.0071***  (0.000) -0.0038***  (0.000) 
Dependent variable: : ln �  
Constant -4.6163***  (0.008)    -4.8105***  (0.009) 
Dependent variable:  ln �  
Constant -2.6437***  (0.340) -0.7930        (0.590) 
ln(TA) 0.1775***  (0.015) 0.4678***  (0.020) 
t 0.0181***  (0.003) -0.0417***  (0.004) 
ln(N) -0.1413***  (0.016) -0.1228***  (0.060) 
ln(ACT) -0.0393        (0.033) -0.6948***  (0.018) 
Average efficiency 66.93 64.87 
Median efficiency 66.021 64.14 
Log-likelihood 25964.01 122085.78 
Number of observations 39768 34261 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
 
Table 4. Cost Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results: Lagged ACT   
Dependent variable: ln(TC/W3)                 Model EX         Model EN 
Constant -2.2394***  (0.416) -2.2316***  (0.417) 
ln(W1/W3) -0.2325***  (0.081) -0.2294***  (0.081) 
ln(W2/W3) 0.5889***  (0.106) 0.5825***  (0.106) 
ln(Y1) 0.1718***  (0.044) 0.1729***  (0.044) 
ln(Y2) 0.4216***  (0.064) 0.4203***  (0.064) 
ln(E) 0.1775***  (0.010) 0.1767***  (0.010) 
0.5 × ln(W1/W3)2 -0.0581***  (0.015) -0.0583***  (0.015) 
ln(W1/W3) × ln(W2/W3) 0.0686***  (0.018) 0.0690***  (0.018) 
0.5 × ln(W2/W3)2 0.1206***  (0.029) 0.1207***  (0.029) 
0.5 × ln(Y1)2 0.0549***  (0.003) 0.0549***  (0.003) 
ln(Y1) × ln(Y2) -0.0503***  (0.003) -0.0503***  (0.003) 
0.5 × ln(Y2)2 0.0601***  (0.006) 0.0602***  (0.006) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W1/W3) -0.0020        (0.006) -0.0021        (0.006) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W2/W3) -0.0072        (0.008) -0.0072        (0.008) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W1/W3) 0.0221***  (0.007) 0.0219***  (0.007) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W2/W3) -0.0339***  (0.009) -0.0335**    (0.009) 
t 0.0648***  (0.015) 0.0665***  (0.015) 
t2 0.0026***  (0.001) 0.0026***  (0.001) 
ln(W1/W3) × t -0.0068***  (0.002) -0.0069***  (0.002) 
ln(W2/W3) × t -0.0141***  (0.004) -0.0142***  (0.004) 
ln(Y1)  ×  t -0.0012        (0.001) -0.0012        (0.001) 
ln(Y2)  ×  t -0.0035***  (0.001) -0.0035***  (0.001) 
Dependent variable: : ln �  
Constant -4.4868*** (0.026)    -4.4867***  (0.026) 
Dependent variable:  ln �  
Constant 6.6475**    (1.388) 6.7057***  (1.391) 
ln(TA) 0.2341***  (0.035) 0.2358***  (0.035) 
t -0.0228**    (0.011) -0.0234**    (0.011) 
ln(N) -0.0392        (0.037) -0.0576        (0.038) 
ln(ACT1) -1.4079***  (0.145) -1.4067***  (0.145) 
Average efficiency 65.12 65.12 
Median efficiency 64.90 64.88 
Log-likelihood 1905.80 4444.90 
Number of observations 3570 3570 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 








Table 5. Cost Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results: The Fed Actions by Type  
Dependent variable: ln(TC/W3)                 Model EX         Model EN 
Constant -1.3163***  (0.334) -2.1135***  (0.421) 
ln(W1/W3) -0.0156        (0.075) -0.1940**    (0.082) 
ln(W2/W3)  0.2736***  (0.010)  0.4950***  (0.106) 
ln(Y1)  0.1884***  (0.039)  0.1859***  (0.044) 
ln(Y2)  0.2654***  (0.055)  0.4012***  (0.065) 
ln(E)  0.2051***  (0.009)  0.1802***  (0.010) 
0.5 × ln(W1/W3)2 -0.0540***  (0.014) -0.0586***  (0.016)  
ln(W1/W3) × ln(W2/W3)  0.0697***  (0.017)  0.0684***  (0.018) 
0.5 × ln(W2/W3)2  0.1081***  (0.028)  0.1339***  (0.030) 
0.5 × ln(Y1)2  0.0428***  (0.002)  0.0563***  (0.003) 
ln(Y1) × ln(Y2) -0.0415***  (0.003) -0.0518***  (0.003) 
0.5 × ln(Y2)2  0.0611***  (0.005)  0.0622***  (0.006) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W1/W3) -0.0169***  (0.005)  0.0002        (0.006) 
ln(Y1) × ln(W2/W3)  0.0124*      (0.007) -0.0115        (0.008) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W1/W3)  0.0197***  (0.006)  0.0173**    (0.007) 
ln(Y2) × ln(W2/W3) -0.0283***  (0.009) -0.0258***  (0.009) 
t  0.0830***  (0.014)  0.0415**    (0.017) 
t2 -0.0006        (0.001)  0.0046***  (0.001) 
ln(W1/W3) × t -0.0071***  (0.002) -0.0058***  (0.002) 
ln(W2/W3) × t -0.0092***  (0.003) -0.0109***  (0.004) 
ln(Y1)  ×  t -0.0033***  (0.001) -0.0010        (0.001) 
ln(Y2)  ×  t -0.0024**    (0.001) -0.0039***  (0.001) 
Dependent variable: : ln �  
Constant              -4.3147***  (0.024)              -4.4807***  (0.026) 
Dependent variable:  ln �  
Constant                    -0.3920        (1.087)               4.9002***  (1.670) 
ln(TA)                     0.1640***  (0.033)               0.2263***  (0.036) 
t                     0.0269*** (0.010)              -0.0257**    (0.013) 
ln(N)                    -0.0997*** (0.036)              -0.0655*      (0.039) 
ln(GBACT)                    -0.4688*** (0.106)              -0.7380***  (0.121) 
ln(DAACT)                    -0.0378       (0.097)              -0.6543***  (0.153) 
Average efficiency                                         65.40                                   64.73 
Median efficiency                                         65.07                                   64.16 
Log-likelihood                                     2053.21                               16714.16 
Number of observations                                          4332                                    3570 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we wanted to understand the effect of Fed’s involvement in the banking 
system on the cost efficiency of US banks for the years between 1997 and 2007. We use the annual 
number of actions reported by the Fed as a proxy measure for the Fed’s involvement (i.e., activity). 
Prior to our estimations, it was not clear whether there would be a positive or negative relationship 
between the Fed activity and efficiency. If the Fed’s actions are not constructive, then this may 
have negative effects on the bank cost efficiency. In addition, the labor force in the Fed may be 
relatively slow to adjust for changing workloads in extreme market conditions. Hence, when the 
work burden reaches extreme levels, it can be difficult for the Fed to make right decisions. Because 
of these reasons, the Fed may not always provide the most desirable environment that could help 
the banks to use their resources more effectively. However, if the Fed were relatively successful 
in the actions it takes, there would be some room for improved cost efficiency and productivity. 
We examined the former, i.e., cost efficiency, by using the recent developments in the stochastic 
frontier analysis. We found that the overall Fed actions had a positive impact on cost efficiency of 
US banks in our sample period. In particular, the Fed was successful in both policy-oriented and 
ownership structure related actions. While this does not enable us to claim that the Fed was 
successful in this period, these results indicate that at least in one dimension this was the case. 
Note that the years between 1997 and 2007 is an interesting period as it includes the minor 
recession of 2001 and some regulations in the financial sector. Hence, although as a robustness 
check we included crisis and post-crisis dummies in our estimations, which lead to qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar results, it would be interesting to implement a similar analysis for other 
time periods to see whether our qualitative results extrapolate to other time periods. Finally, note 
also that, the actions of the Fed are diverse, and it is difficult to measure the corresponding 
individual “activity level” for each Fed-action. Hence, using the total number of actions may not 
necessarily reflect the “overall activity level” of the Fed. Therefore, it may be interesting to see 
whether our results are robust to alternative measures of Fed’s activity level. We leave these 
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